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I. INTRODUCTION
When the California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s summary
judgment for the defendants in Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400,1 it
further eroded the chance that crime victims attacked on property where
they work or reside would be able to recover from the property owner
for negligent security measures. What was surprising about the case was
not the court’s inclination to protect the property owner, but the ground
on which the court affirmed summary judgment: absence of evidence to
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. The
author appreciates the input of faculty colleagues Ruth Jones, Thomas Main, and John
Sims, and the thoughts and advice of her torts colleagues Larry Levine, Greg Pingree,
and Kevin Culhane. Thanks also to research assistants Byron Beebe and Kristi Morioka
for their help on this project.
1. 23 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2001).
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raise a triable issue of fact on causation.2 Like many torts professors, I
am familiar with the incremental increase in barriers to liability
occurring in California3 and nationwide,4 but the element of “duty,”
rather than “causation in fact,”5 has been the customary vehicle for this
resolution.6 In this Essay, I plan to address both the significance of this
2. Id. at 1152, 1154. Under California’s summary judgment statute, a defendant
may obtain summary judgment if she can point to an absence of evidence on an essential
element of the plaintiff’s claim. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473c(c) (West Supp. 2003).
The burden of production then shifts to the party opposing the motion “to make a prima
facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” Aguilar v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 510 (Cal. 2001). Aguilar, Saelzler, and Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l,
Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000), constitute a trilogy of cases that bring California’s
summary judgment standard very close to the federal standard. Glenn S. Koppel, The
California Supreme Court Speaks Out on Summary Judgment in Its Own “Trilogy” of
Decisions: Has the Celotex Era Arrived?, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 483, 483 & n.3 (2002).
3. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California
Experience with “New” Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 456, 466 (1999) (describing a
general trend in the California Supreme Court that removes power from juries, returns it
to courts, and tilts in favor of defendants).
4. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 649–50 (1992) (noting the expansion of
cases imposing liability on landlords for their failure to adopt reasonable security
measures to protect their tenants and others against foreseeable criminal attacks and
suggesting that this period of expansion has ended); see also Shelley Ross Saxer, “Am I
My Brother’s Keeper?”: Requiring Landowner Disclosure of the Presence of Sex
Offenders and Other Criminal Activity, 80 NEB. L. REV. 522, 537–38 (2001) (giving
examples of cases from several states that limit premises liability cases to situations
where there is a danger of imminent harm).
5. California has condensed causation in fact and proximate causation into a
single legal standard under the moniker of “legal” or “proximate cause.” See Mitchell v.
Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 876–79 (Cal. 1991). However, the test the Mitchell court
approved contains both the cause in fact and proximate cause strands and employs the
substantial factor test for cause in fact. Id. Likewise, the Restatement and the
Restatement (Second) both use the term “legal cause” to encompass cause in fact and
proximate cause. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 9 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 9 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. The comments to the second tentative
draft of the Restatement (Third) reveal the American Law Institute’s judgment that its
prior formulations had been neither widely adopted nor particularly helpful.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 26
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The tentative draft
separates the two concepts into chapters entitled “Factual Cause” and “Scope of Liability
(Proximate Cause).” See id. §§ 28, 29. In this Essay, I use the terms “cause in fact,”
“causation,” and “factual causation” interchangeably.
6. Because this type of case may require a landowner to have taken steps to
protect a third person from injury by another, the existence of a legal duty is not a
foregone conclusion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, § 314 (stating that the
fact that an actor realizes or should realize action is necessary for another’s aid or
protection does not of itself impose a duty); id. § 315 (stating that there is no duty to
control the conduct of a third person unless a special relationship exists between the
actor and the other). Many cases have discussed the issue of when duty ought to be
recognized. For instance, California has at times emphasized the need to show
foreseeability based on the surrounding circumstances. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington
Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 657–59 (Cal. 1985) (rejecting the rigid “prior similar
incidents” test for determining the foreseeability of third-party conduct in favor of the

972

DAVIES PAGES.DOC

[VOL. 40: 971, 2003]

1/9/2020 3:00 PM

Undercutting Premises Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

analytical shift for plaintiffs who are alleging that negligent failures to
provide security contributed to their injuries and the potential
implications for other types of negligence cases.7
Personal injury attorneys rightly perceive Saelzler as having erected a
substantial, almost insurmountable barrier to premises liability.8 Under
cover of the summary judgment statute, the California Supreme Court
has undercut substantive tort law by shifting the meaning of duty and
cause in fact and eroding the balance between judge and jury that has
been developed through years of tort law.9 The court’s interpretation
more fluid “totality of the circumstances” test). However, the California Supreme Court
shifted its focus eight years after Isaacs, holding that duty is determined “by a balancing
of ‘foreseeability’ of the criminal acts against the ‘burdensomeness, vagueness, and
efficacy’ of the proposed security measures.” Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863
P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993). The court concluded that the “requisite degree of
foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents,” and
that “a high degree of foreseeability is required in order to find that the scope of a
landlord’s duty of care includes the hiring of security guards.” Id.
7. The concept of judges erecting evidentiary barriers that modify or circumvent
causation rules is not new. Some commentators have argued that federal trial judges in
products liability cases have been doing just that in their roles as evidentiary gatekeepers
monitoring the admissibility of scientific evidence. See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding
the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening
Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (1999). More
generally, scholars have recognized that judges twist causation analysis to accommodate
concerns that actually pertain to different elements of negligence. See, e.g., Leon Green,
The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 544 (1962)
(claiming that a common vice in analysis of negligence is overloading the causal relation
issue with difficulties more readily and more adequately dealt with in the consideration
of other issues); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 68–72
(1956) (discussing how policy considerations are used by judges to determine whether a
causation issue should be submitted to a jury); Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 2195, 2201 (2000) (citing historical evidence that causation was
narrowly conceived in the nineteenth century to protect class interests).
8. Saelzler’s attorney’s webpage states that Saelzler is “the last nail in the coffin
of the tort of premises owners’ liability for third party criminal assaults.” The Law
Offices of Borton, Petrini & Conron LLP, Daniel B. Wolfberg, at http://bpclaw.com/
wolfberg.htm (last visited May 27, 2003). Gerald A. Spala, a defense attorney who has
written a commentary on Saelzler, states that the case seals the fate of many future cases
and offers land and business owners “a significant weapon in concluding before trial a
great number of these cases.” Law Offices of Gerald A. Spala, Tort Law and Criminal
Acts, at http://www.geraldspala.com/temp/saelzler.htm (last visited June 12, 2001); see
also Michael J. Estep & Shari Hollis-Ross, California Supreme Court Makes It Harder
to Sue Property Owners in Security Issue Cases, http://www.burnhambrown.com/publications/
article.cfm?pubid=12 (June 28, 2001); Eric A. Schneider, Favorable Defense Case—Liability
for Criminal Acts: Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, at http://www.amclaw.com/Saelzler.html
(last visited May 27, 2003).
9. See infra notes 86–99 and accompanying text.
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conflicts with virtually every goal of tort law, whether corrective,
compensatory, or deterrent.10 The Saelzler decision has the potential to
leave the most vulnerable and poorest plaintiffs in the worst position to
obtain compensation for negligence.11 In addition, defendants who owe
legal duties and have breached them have no incentive to provide greater
protection from crime to those entering their land, and in fact, may have a
significant disincentive.12 In short, the Saelzler decision potentially
undercuts most of what we understand about how tort law should operate.
The substantive tort implications of the California Supreme Court’s
opinion in Saelzler, pointed out in dissenting opinions by Justices
Kennard and Werdegar,13 have provoked little commentary in law
reviews14 or the public press15 despite the opinion’s serious impact on
10. Dan Dobbs lists compensation of injured persons and deterrence of undesirable
behavior as the most commonly mentioned aims of tort law, but suggests they are
subsumed in whole or in part by the broader, often conflicting goals of morality or
corrective justice, and policy or social utility. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8
(2000). This conflict arises because corrective justice focuses on the correctness of
imposing liability, while the goal of social policy is to provide a system of rules that
furthers the greater good of society. Id. Dobbs suggests that the next generation of torts
lawyers and scholars must strive for a good mixture of social utility and personal
accountability. Id. § 12. Gary Schwartz associates negligence liability with strong fairness
values and an obvious concern for public safety. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 607. He believes
that the negligence standard has achieved a synthesis of fairness and deterrence values. Id.
11. Despite the existence of statutory compensation for crime victims in some
states, those statutory benefits are not nearly as comprehensive as tort damages. See,
e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 13957(b) (West Supp. 2003) (limiting recovery under the
statute to a maximum of $35,000, which may be increased to $70,000 if federal funding
is available); FLA. STAT. ch. 960.13(9)(A) (1999) (limiting recovery to $25,000 for all
costs or $50,000 if a written finding states that the victim suffered catastrophic injury);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-18 (West 2001) (limiting recovery to a maximum of $25,000);
see also infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
13. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1155 (Cal. 2001) (Kennard, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1158 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
14. The case has been discussed with regard to development of the standard for
summary judgment. See Koppel, supra note 2, at 531–40. The issue of causation in
cases involving landowner liability for crimes on premises was discussed generally, and
I believe wrongly, in an article by Rex Sharp. See Rex A. Sharp, Paying for the Crimes
of Others? Landowner Liability for Crimes on the Premises, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 11, 57
(1987) (asserting that cause in fact would not be proven even if a plaintiff could prove it
was considerably more probable than not that extra security would have prevented the crime).
15. Frederic D. Cohen & Gerald A. Clausen, Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400:
Landowner Liability for Criminal Acts of Third Parties and the Question of Causation,
22 CIV. LITIG. REP. 77, 79 (2000) (analyzing the court of appeal decision from the
perspective of the plaintiff and defense bars); Maura Dolan, Ruling in Assault Favors
Landlords, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2001, at B1 (describing the Saelzler litigation and the
court’s opinion); Sonia Giordani, Plaintiffs Bar Decries New Burden in Premises Suits,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 4, 2001, at 4 (describing the California Supreme Court
ruling as one that “raises the bar on premises liability cases [and] also requires plaintiffs
to work harder just to avoid summary judgment in most civil cases”); Dennis Yokoyama,
Danger Zones, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 45 (describing the opinions of the court and
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the ability of plaintiffs to seek redress against landlords. There are
several possible reasons for this lack of debate. First, the question of
what evidence is required to survive a motion for summary judgment on
the issue of causation is dauntingly technical, involving complex issues
of procedure, evidence, and tort law. Second, although the majority’s
analysis is arguably misguided, it is clear that cause in fact could
properly negate liability in some cases at the summary judgment stage,
particularly in light of California’s liberalization of summary judgment
rules.16 Thus, the issue is not susceptible to a clean resolution that will
eliminate the problem. Third, Saelzler purports merely to affirm a long
line of lower appellate authority,17 and other states’ decisions reflect the
same thinking.18 Thus the issue may seem either tired or futile.
characterizing the case as one in which the court “continued its recent trend of ruling in favor
of defendant landowners in premises liability actions involving third-party criminal conduct”).
16. The effect of Saelzler and other California Supreme Court cases liberalizing
summary judgment rules has been to “extend the reach of summary judgment to resolve
issues traditionally reserved for jury determination.” Koppel, supra note 2, at 483.
Indeed, federal law and California law have both “unleashed” summary judgment as a
tool for case management. Id. at 554–67. Judges are permitted to decide on summary
judgment issues that previously would have been reserved for rulings on a directed
verdict motion at trial. Id. at 490. In addition, even before revisions to the summary
judgment rules, causation issues were frequently decided before trial as a matter of law.
See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920) (stating that
the motion to dismiss due to lack of causation should have been granted because the
jury’s determination that the ship’s lack of life preservers caused the decedent’s demise
was pure conjecture and speculation); Salinetro v. Nystrom, 341 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding the grant of directed verdict against the plaintiff for lack
of causation, reasoning that even if the doctor had asked the plaintiff if she were
pregnant, the plaintiff would have answered in the negative); Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp.
Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 215 (Md. 1990) (holding that no causation can exist where the
plaintiff has less than a fifty percent chance of survival).
17. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1149–51.
18. See, e.g., Post Props., Inc. v. Doe, 495 S.E.2d 573, 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that, although the attacker could have entered because of the defendant’s
negligence, he also could have been authorized to be on the premises); N.W. v.
Amalgamated Trust & Sav. Bank, 554 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that
it is a “well settled rule that liability cannot be predicated upon surmise or conjecture as
to the cause of the injury”); Perry v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 635 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662
(App. Div. 1995) (holding that, where a building had no locks for the outside doors, the
landlord was not liable to a tenant assaulted by her ex-boyfriend because the plaintiff
offered no evidence that her assailant took advantage of the unlocked doors or that the
assailant was an intruder with no right or privilege to be present there); Kirsten M. v.
Bettina Equities Co., 634 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (App. Div. 1995) (stating that, absent proof
of the method by which the perpetrator entered the building, the landlord was not liable
to a tenant who was raped in the laundry room by an unknown assailant, even though the
building had defective locks on the main entrance); Wright v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth.,
624 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (App. Div. 1995) (dismissing the complaint on grounds including

975

DAVIES PAGES.DOC

1/9/2020 3:00 PM

The fact that the issues posed by Saelzler are subtle and technical only
highlights the importance of addressing them with attention and
vigilance. The existence of cases that raise the same type of issue in
other jurisdictions underscores the importance of understanding
Saelzler’s implications. I hope this Essay will bring the substantive tort
ramifications of Saelzler to the attention of judges and lawyers and assist
them in addressing the causation issues.
II. ABOUT SAELZLER
Marianne Saelzler was delivering a package for Federal Express to a
large apartment complex during daylight hours when she was attacked
and injured on the premises by several men.19 Saelzler was unable to
identify or apprehend the individuals who had attacked her.20 She sued
the owners of the apartment complex, Advanced Group 400, alleging
that they had breached a legal duty to her by failing to provide adequate
security in three ways: (1) by failing to keep entrance gates locked and
functional, (2) by failing to provide daytime security despite the fact that
the complex was known to be crime-ridden, and (3) by failing to warn
her of the risk of criminal attack.21 Although California courts, like
many jurisdictions, are hesitant to impose a legal obligation (the duty
element of a negligence claim) on landowners to control the criminal
acts carried out on the premises,22 Saelzler was able to surmount this
hurdle.23 She was able to allege facts showing that the complex where
she was attacked had a record of frequent, recurring violent criminal
activity, of which the defendants were well aware.24 There was
considerable gang activity surrounding the complex, and one gang was
allegedly headquartered within the complex.25 Also, the manager of the
complex was the only person who had consistent security protection,
always having an escort when she left her office to travel to her car, even
during the day.26 Thus, Saelzler showed a pattern of serious criminal
the plaintiff’s inability to prove that the attacker was not a tenant of the building and the
fact that the attack took place in the stairwell instead of the hallway).
19. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1147.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1145, 1147. The trial court apparently found that the plaintiff had
offered no evidence that the defendants could have reasonably and effectively warned
members of the public from unspecified dangers of unknown individuals on the
premises. Id. at 1147. This theory of breach received no attention from the California
Supreme Court on review.
22. See supra note 6.
23. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1145.
24. Id. at 1147.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1147–48. Under California’s Ann M. case, these allegations met the
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behavior at the complex and the management’s knowledge of the danger
and of the need for security. As to breach of that duty, the evidence was
not quite as strong but still sufficient to survive summary judgment.27
There was evidence from which a jury could infer that the defendants
had been unreasonable in failing to provide security during daylight
hours28 or, alternately, in failing to repair or maintain the security gate.29
The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that there
was no “reasonably probable causal connection” between the defendants’
breach of duty and the plaintiff’s injuries.30 The plaintiff’s evidence did
not reveal whether the security gate that the plaintiff had found propped
open had been the source of the assailants’ entry, nor was it clear
whether the assailants were tenants, visitors, or intruders.31 The plaintiff’s
inability to specify the origin or identity of the attackers doomed her
argument that the lack of daytime security was a cause in fact of her
injury because she could not show that extra security would have made
any difference; the thought was that tenant assailants would not have
been stopped by functioning gates or security guards.32 The court of
appeal reversed, believing that the defendants had neither negated a
necessary element of the plaintiff’s case nor demonstrated that under no
hypothesis were there material facts requiring a trial.33
landowner duty requirements. The court’s approach to duty in Ann M. requires a
balancing of the foreseeability of harm against the burden of imposing a duty to protect
against the criminal acts of third persons. In this way, the court takes into account the
interests of business owners and land possessors as well as those of customers or other
entrants on land who are the likely crime victims. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping
Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993).
27. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1145.
28. The defendants regularly maintained nighttime security; occasionally, and on a
random basis, they would provide daytime security. Id. at 1147–48. Both the police
officers and the head of the defendants’ security firm had suggested that the defendants
begin regular daytime security patrols. Id. at 1148. The defendants’ manager was aware
of extensive crime on the premises, both from approximately fifty police reports in the
previous year and from reports of its own security force. Id. at 1147. Finally, the
evidence showed that some pizza companies did not deliver to the premises because of
security concerns. Id.
29. However, the defendants’ security logs showed that they regularly inspected
access gates to make sure the gates were operational. Id. at 1148. Other evidence of
reasonableness of steps taken to insure security included the fact that the defendants
posted notices threatening eviction of persons involved in drug or gang activity and had
carried through with evictions of violent tenants. Id.
30. Id. at 1148.
31. Id. at 1147.
32. Id. at 1152.
33. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 106 (Ct. App. 1999), rev’d,
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A majority of the California Supreme Court found the case to fall within
a line of court of appeal cases holding that “abstract negligence,” without
proof of a causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the
plaintiff’s injury, is insufficient.34 The court reasoned that, given the
plaintiff’s factual deficits and what it characterized as a weak and
speculative expert opinion that daytime security would have made a
difference, the plaintiff could not show that it was more probable than not
that additional security precautions would have prevented the attack.35
The court expressed several reasons for its opinion: the fear that finding
causation would result in every landowner’s becoming an insurer of the
safety of those entering the premises, the financial burden that increased
security would impose on landowners and ultimately, tenants of lowincome housing, and the possibility that a different resolution would
uniformly preclude summary judgment on the causation issue in future
cases.36 The court responded to the objection that its opinion would rule
out recovery against land possessors by asserting that if a plaintiff could
show that an assailant had taken advantage of a lapse in security, and this
had been a substantial factor in the assault, causation could be established.37
Future plaintiffs could prove this causal link through eyewitness
testimony, security cameras, fingerprints, or other forms of evidence.38
23 P.3d 1143. The Saelzler majority stated the burden somewhat differently, noting that
under the amended summary judgment statute, the moving party must make a showing
that one or more elements cannot be established, at which point the opposing party must
show she can reasonably expect to establish the element in contention). Saelzler, 23
P.3d at 1146–47. The Saelzler majority also characterized the court of appeal’s opinion
as having shifted the burden to the defendants because of the defendants’ failure to
provide security, and it found this approach contrary to the summary judgment statute
and existing case law. Id. at 1154. In fact, the gist of the court of appeal’s thinking was
that, given the high degree of foreseeability the plaintiff demonstrated to establish duty,
causation should generally not be defeated as a matter of law unless there is evidence
establishing that the general causal connection between the absence of security and
criminal activity does not apply. Saelzler, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112. The court of appeal
viewed this analysis as consistent with the general causation principle that where the
injury that occurred is precisely the sort of thing that proper care on the part of the
defendant would be intended to prevent, the court should allow a certain liberality to the jury
in deciding the issue. Id. at 110 (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 270 (5th ed. 1984)).
34. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1149–52. Appellate opinions in the line the court cited
include the following: Nola M. v. University of Southern California, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97
(Ct. App. 1993); Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202 (Ct. App. 1989); Lopez v. McDonald’s
Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Ct. App. 1987); Constance B. v. State of California, 223 Cal. Rptr.
645 (Ct. App. 1986); Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Ct. App. 1985).
35. The Saelzler court thought the primary reason for functioning security gates
and guards at the entrances would be to exclude unauthorized persons and trespassers;
given the number of problem tenants, the inference that the assailant was an intruder
could not be made. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1151–52.
36. Id. at 1152–53.
37. Id. at 1154.
38. Id.
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There were two dissenting opinions; one focused on the majority’s use
of the summary judgment statute to change the respective roles of judge
and jury, and the other focused largely on the substantive tort implications.
Justice Kennard believed that the majority opinion blurred the distinction
between the role of the court and jury, with the end result reducing the
jury’s role.39 In her view, a plaintiff should survive summary judgment,
even under the amended and rather stringent summary judgment statute,
if she could show that a reasonable trier of fact could find in her favor.40
Justice Kennard suggested that the majority had usurped the jury’s role
by ruling on whether causation had been established by a preponderance
of the evidence, instead of asking whether the plaintiff had produced
evidence from which a trier of fact could have concluded that the
element had been established.41 Justice Werdegar focused instead on
what she viewed as a complete distortion of the law on causation. The
majority was requiring the plaintiff to show that security devices would
have changed the outcome, a burden nearly impossible to meet in many
cases, especially where no eyewitnesses exist.42 Justice Werdegar also
criticized the majority for wrongly importing policy concerns relevant to
duty or proximate cause into the causation analysis,43 for rejecting
entirely the plaintiff’s proffered expert testimony,44 and for making
unwarranted factual inferences.45
III. TORT CAUSATION AND SAELZLER
Although both the majority and the dissenting opinions make several
distinct arguments, the real dispute in Saelzler is about the quantum of
proof necessary to survive a summary judgment motion and reach a
jury.46 Justice Werdegar’s claim that the majority distorted the law of
causation and Justice Kennard’s concern about usurpation of the jury’s
role both stem from an understanding that cause in fact, like breach, is a
39. Id. at 1157 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1158, 1164 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1160.
45. Id. at 1159.
46. It is beyond dispute that the broader standard for summary judgment allows
resolution of issues that courts would have previously reserved for a jury. Koppel, supra
note 2, at 490. But despite the increasing reach of the standard, there remain questions
as to whether a plaintiff’s evidence meets the threshold of raising a material issue.
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quintessential jury question and one that can rarely be proven as an
absolute.47 Indeed, the preponderance of evidence standard applied to all
negligence elements permits the inference that a defendant’s breach is
causally related to the plaintiff’s injury when the fact finder finds it more
likely than not.48
Certainly there are cases in which the plaintiff cannot meet the threshold,
but these do not and should not change the way courts approach
sufficiency of evidence questions. The plaintiff’s task is to present
evidence connecting the defendant’s alleged breach to the injury, and
sometimes, neither direct nor circumstantial evidence exists. For
example, in one California case, an assault, apparently committed by one
group of patrons upon another, occurred in the Dodger Stadium parking
lot following a game.49 Even if one could prove that security staffing
levels had been unreasonable, there was little reason to think that the
presence of extra security would have prevented the assault, given both
the huge lot and the lack of any evidence that the event was anything
other than a random outburst.50 Similarly, in a Utah case, a guest in the
defendant’s hotel was found murdered, but there was no sign of forced

47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, § 433B cmt. b.
48. See DOBBS, supra note 10, § 173.
[C]ourts have often recognized, implicitly or explicitly, that the jury must be
permitted to make causal judgments from its ordinary experience without
demanding impossible proof about what would have occurred if the defendant
had behaved more safely. . . . [I]f the defendant’s conduct is deemed negligent
for the very reason that it creates a core risk of the kind of harm suffered by the
plaintiff, then it is often plausible to infer causation in fact.
Id.; see also David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1765, 1773–74 (1997) (noting the preponderance standard and stating that “no plaintiff
will ever be able to establish beyond all doubt what would have happened had the
defendant’s conduct been lawful”).
49. Noble v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395, 396 (Ct. App. 1985). Mr.
Noble and his wife were walking to their car in the stadium parking lot when they
witnessed other fans urinating and vomiting near a car. Mr. Noble apparently said
something to them and a scuffle ensued. He was injured as a result, and his wife brought
a claim for emotional distress for witnessing the injury to her husband. The case went to
a jury, which evidenced confusion but ultimately found the plaintiff husband to be fiftyfive percent at fault and the wife to be thirty-five percent at fault. Id.
50. Unlike Saelzler, Noble was a case where there were no allegations of any
specific breaches of security or other negligence, but rather a generalized allegation that
more security would have prevented the injury. See id. at 399. The evidence revealed
very low foreseeability of injury (five parking lot fights in the past sixty-six night games)
and that a security force was employed to police the parking lot. See id. at 397. It is a
case in which the evidence supporting duty and breach of duty seemed completely
inadequate, and there was no basis on which to think security could have prevented an
altercation between departing fans. Saelzler, on the other hand, had far more evidence of
the predictability of criminal activity, specific allegations of negligence with regard to security
devices on the premises and, despite the lack of proof as to the identity of the attacker, a
much more plausible claim that reasonable precautions could have prevented the attack.

980

DAVIES PAGES.DOC

[VOL. 40: 971, 2003]

1/9/2020 3:00 PM

Undercutting Premises Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

entry.51 With no evidence as to how the murderer had entered the room,
the court found that even if there had been a showing of negligence by
the defendant, any supposition as to the manner of entry would be
speculation.52 In such cases, summary judgment should be granted.
But the California Supreme Court went well beyond a review of the
sufficiency of the evidence in Saelzler. Although the court suggested
that it was seeking evidence to meet the substantial factor test,53 the
court’s examples of the necessary proof and the cases it relied upon
strongly suggest that, unless evidence shows an assailant in fact
exploited a security breach, there will never be grounds for a case to get
to a jury.54 The existence of that level of proof would clearly establish
causation, but it would set the bar too high for most cases, thus depriving
the jury of the opportunity to make reasonable inferences and deductions
from the facts. For example, in Saelzler, a jury, if given the chance,
might have inferred from the alleged facts that the presence of security
guards would have deterred criminal attacks, whether from inside or
outside the complex. This inference would be logical because the
manager had security at all times when leaving her office, and daytime
security had been recommended by both the complex’s own security
firm and the police. Yet the court not only precluded the jury from
considering this issue, but went so far as to adopt the defendants’ theory
despite the existence of evidence that could have warranted the fact
finder’s adoption of the plaintiff’s version.55 By characterizing the case
51. Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 241–42 (Utah 1985).
52. Id. at 246.
53. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1153.
54. Id. at 1153–54. The court made clear that it is looking for evidence that shows
the “assailant took advantage of the defendant’s lapse . . . in the course of committing his
attack, and that the omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury.” The
evidence that could prove this might include “[e]yewitnesses, security cameras, even
fingerprints or recent signs of break-in or unauthorized entry.” Id. at 1154. The court
found Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Ct. App. 1996), to be the
most analogous case. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1150. In Leslie G., summary judgment for the
defendant was affirmed in a case where the plaintiff sued the owners of her apartment
building for negligence in failing to repair a broken security gate. The court of appeal
stated that without direct evidence that the rapist had entered through the broken gate,
the plaintiff could not survive summary judgment. Leslie G., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
55. See Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1154.
First, and contrary to the Court of Appeal’s hyperbole, the evidence discloses
no flagrant failure in this case. As we have seen, most of the assaults and
similar incidents of crime plaintiff has cited occurred during the night, and the
record indicates defendants did provide extensive nighttime security.
Moreover, plaintiff’s own evidence showed that defendants at least attempted
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as a claim of inadequate, as opposed to nonexistent, security,56 the court
made the plaintiff’s burden prohibitively difficult.57 This characterization,
pivotal to the outcome, turned on purely factual inferences that should
have been made by the jury.
There is no reason to think courts are able to draw better factual
inferences than juries in negligence cases.58 In Saelzler, for example,
Justice Werdegar took the majority to task for making the inference that
daytime security would only serve the function of keeping unwanted
intruders from entering the complex; in her view, daytime security would
have been instrumental in monitoring and controlling the criminal elements
inside the large complex.59 Given two plausible inferences, the jury rather
than the court should have made the decision as to which was more likely.
Many plaintiffs have retained experts to try to surmount the inherent
uncertainty about whether security would likely have deterred the crime
that resulted in their injuries. However, courts tend to disapprove of this
costly addition to the litigation process.60 In premises liability cases,

Id.

to keep all security gates in working order, performing regular inspections and
repairs.

56. The parties disputed whether or not there was security during the evenings.
The defendants pointed to the occasional employment of evening security, while the
plaintiff pointed to the absence of regular security. Id. at 1147–48.
57. A plaintiff alleging that existing security is inadequate triggers the objection
that it is impossible to know how much security is enough. A claim that there was no
security at all has been more successful in convincing a court that, had some security
been provided, it would likely have proven an effective deterrent. See, e.g., Phillips v.
Perils of Pauline Food Prod., Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 38 (Ct. App. 1995) (ordered not
published) (distinguishing nonfeasance and misfeasance).
58. The fallacy that judges can decide factual issues better than juries has been
illustrated various times in connection with decisions related to breach of duty. The classic
example is Justice Holmes’s conclusion, in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman,
275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927), that a plaintiff was conclusively unreasonable if he did not stop,
look, listen, and exit his vehicle to look down the track at a railroad crossing. Judge
Cardozo’s opinion in Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1934), pointed
out the problems with Holmes’s approach. While Holmes furthered judicial economy, he
did so by sacrificing the fact-sensitivity and flexibility required to reach a fair result.
There are numerous empirical studies on the issue of jury competency. For a
comprehensive review and evaluation of the literature, see Michael J. Saks, Do We
Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1262–80 (1992). Professor Saks concludes that “[t]he great
majority of jury verdicts reach the same result that judges would in the same cases. Id. at
1287; see also Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?,
in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 248, 248–81 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)
(describing the results of a survey the author conducted); Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort
Juries Punish Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 286–88 (2003) (reviewing CASS
R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES (2002), a report of empirical study on jury
awards and concluding that, contrary to Sunstein’s view, judges do only a minimally
better job at correctly awarding punitive damages than do juries).
59. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1159 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
60. Although the American system generally discourages opinion testimony, both
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courts frequently reject an expert’s testimony about the role that
particular security devices or strategies play in crime prevention because
the experts express only their opinions and cannot testify with any
certainty as to whether changes would have averted the crimes.61 Yet
experts, by definition, give opinions, and they do so even on motions for
summary judgment.62 Plaintiffs seeking to use expert testimony thus
encounter the same categorical view of causation that they find when
they rely on lay testimony; courts want the experts to establish causation
absolutely and often this is impossible. In my view, because of the costs
entailed, plaintiffs and defendants would probably benefit if premises
liability cases could be litigated without the use of experts. In many
instances, the experts’ contributions offer little more than confirmation
of what lay juries would infer. But, as with other types of cases, an
expert with proper preparation and analysis might testify persuasively
that certain precautions would likely have prevented a criminal attack.63
lay and expert opinion may be admissible. FED. R. EVID. 701, 702; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 702,
720, 800, 801 (West 1995). When the jury is equipped to make the factual determination
without such evidence, expert evidence should be excluded. See Brugh v. Peterson, 159
N.W.2d 321, 325 (Neb. 1968) (finding that the expert testimony was neither necessary
nor advisable as an aid to the jury). In California, the determination of the competency
and qualification of an expert is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Redevelopment Agency v. First Christian Church, 189 Cal. Rptr. 749, 757 (Ct. App.
1983). Its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of
discretion is shown. Id.
61. In Nola M., the court criticized the expert for finding fault with all of the
University of Southern California’s security efforts and explaining how he would have
done the job better, but being unable to say that a different configuration would have
changed the outcome. Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 107 (Ct. App.
1993); see also Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 794–95 (Ct. App.
1996) (excluding an expert because of the court’s determination that the expert’s opinion
was based on speculation); Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202, 209 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding
that the expert opinion was properly excluded by the trial court as too speculative).
62. See Edward Brunet, The Use and Misuse of Expert Testimony in Summary
Judgment, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 93, 93–94 (1988) (discussing the use of experts at the
summary judgment stage and noting that, while summary judgment affidavits are to be
made on the basis of personal knowledge, experts usually do not have personal
knowledge). Brunet notes that current evidentiary trends encourage the use of experts
and that experts are “common-place” in some types of cases, such as medical
malpractice cases. Id. at 94.
63. The California Rules of Evidence attempt to assure that the expert’s opinion is
reliable by limiting experts to those opinions that are based on matter “that is of a type
that reasonably may be relied upon” by experts in the field. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801
(West 1995). In the event the expert opinion is based on novel scientific principles,
California uses the Kelly test, from People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976). Under
that test, the proponent must persuade the judge that the scientific principle or technique
has been “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
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It is perfectly legitimate to require experts to be reliable, but it is wrong
to expect their testimony to establish causation conclusively.
Saelzler’s potential stranglehold on this type of premises liability case
is apparent upon consideration of what has followed in its wake. In a
recent case involving the shooting of a patron during a liquor store
robbery, the California Court of Appeal followed Saelzler’s lead in
completely discounting all of the evidence that the plaintiff was able to
present.64 Initially, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the
ground that no duty existed, but the trial court ruled for the plaintiff.65
The case went to trial, where a motion for nonsuit was granted on the
ground that one prior robbery at the store did not provide sufficient
foreseeability to establish a duty and that there was no evidence that, had
security measures existed, the robbery would have been prevented.66
The court of appeal held that while the store owed its patrons a duty to
take reasonable steps to secure its premises against robbery because the
store had been the site of an armed robbery six months earlier, the
evidence was insufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden on causation.67
Although the plaintiff’s expert, a police officer who patrolled the area on
a bike and owned his own private investigation company, testified that
several security measures that deter crime could have been used, the
court found the expert’s opinion too speculative.68 It found no evidence
that various security measures—fewer papers blocking the windows,
signs indicating the presence of surveillance,69 a sign advising of limited
amounts of money on hand—would have made a difference.70 The court
concluded that a security guard likewise would have made no difference
because the plaintiff himself was a security guard and did not stop the
robbery.71 The court paid no attention to the fact that there had been
only fifteen seconds between the assailants’ entry into the store and the
shooting, or that the plaintiff had been acting not as a security guard, but
as a customer receiving change, at the moment he was shot.72
field in which it belongs.” Id. at 1244 (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923)). Federal courts use the four guidelines set forth in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to assess the scientific validity of
certain scientific evidence.
64. Yoon v. Suh, No. B144809, 2001 WL 1227950, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2001).
65. Id. at *1.
66. Id. at *3–4.
67. Id. at *4.
68. Id. at *6.
69. There was a surveillance camera, but it was aimed only at the cash register and
did not record the crime in issue. Id. at *1 n.3. There was also a door alarm, but it was
not triggered because the store was open at the time of the robbery. Id. at *1.
70. Id. at *7.
71. Id.
72. The plaintiff was at the store purchasing cigarettes for resale in his own store.
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As the Saelzler court envisioned, there will be some cases in which a
plaintiff will have the required proof that the security device alleged to
have permitted the security breach would have prevented the crime.73
For example, in a recent California case, a plaintiff survived summary
judgment when she sued her landlord because an assailant had beaten
her after she had parked in a carport near her apartment.74 She alleged
evidence to prove both that her landlord had asked the city to close an
alley adjoining the carport to reduce crime and that some of the parking
spaces in her complex had been closed off by gates.75 She stated further
that she did not recognize the assailant as a fellow tenant and that he had
entered the carport via its ungated alley entrance.76 The court of appeal
concluded that the defendants had not satisfied their burden of producing
evidence that would require a trier of fact to find, more likely than not,
an absence of causation.77
Cases in which plaintiffs are able to prove causation at the level of
certainty the court contemplates will be few; the challenge is to
determine whether cases lacking documentary evidence and eyewitnesses
can go forward. It is not possible, or even desirable, to try to specify exactly
what evidence should suffice to raise a triable issue of fact regarding
causation; the factual variation is too great and judges must exercise
Although he was trained as a security guard, he was at the defendant’s store as a patron.
Presumably, he was not dressed as a security guard. He had a gun with him, but it was
tucked in the back waistband of his pants. He had not wanted to leave it in the car. Id. at *2.
73. See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1154 (Cal. 2001). That
this level of certainty is required is fairly clear from a number of comments: “[S]he is
unable to prove they would not have succeeded in assaulting her if defendants had
provided additional security precautions,” id. at 1145; “Despite her expert’s speculation,
plaintiff cannot show that roving guards would have encountered her assailants or
prevented the attack,” id. at 1152; “[I]f the plaintiff in that case, [Leslie G.], could have
proved her rape could have been prevented by a working security gate ‘we wouldn’t be
having this discussion,’” id. at 1154 (quoting Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr.
2d 785, 793 n.5 (Ct. App. 1996)).
74. Wiesman v. Plutsky, No. B151727, 2002 WL 1924028, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 20, 2002).
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id. at *1.
77. Id. at *9. The court stated that the defendants’ expert’s opinion did not bear on
whether gating would have deterred or otherwise prevented the robbery. Id. This panel
of the court of appeal appears to have given some teeth to the requirement that the party
moving for summary judgment make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any
triable issue of material fact. See id. In Saelzler, Justice Chin made it clear that the
burden on the movant can be met simply by pointing to an absence of evidence in the
record to support the plaintiff’s prima facie case, thus bringing California to the brink of
the federal model. See Koppel, supra note 2, at 533.
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their judgment.78 In doing so, courts need to remind themselves of the
large body of law that emphasizes the inherent uncertainty entailed in
most causal inquiries. Such ambiguity is something courts simply have
to live with, or they risk converting causation into an impossibly high
barrier.79 Years ago, Leon Green cautioned against exactly the situation
that seems to have evolved in Saelzler and similar cases.80 He described
the causal relation issues in cases involving failure to provide safeguards
for the victim’s protection as among the “most difficult” and cautioned
against framing the inquiry in terms of whether the injury would have
been averted had the defendant performed his duty.81 As he put it, “To
ask whether he would have escaped unscathed had the facilities been
provided may present a false issue heavily weighted against the victim
and one that can seldom, if ever, be answered.”82 Green also observed
that much of the confusion about causation stems from the courts’
tendency to overburden the element with policy concerns that relate to
other elements of negligence.83 That is precisely what occurred in Saelzler.

78. Inevitably, some courts reach different conclusions on the same basic facts, but
they must grapple with the uncertainty. Compare Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo,
14 N.E.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. 1938) (holding the dismissal of a complaint to be improper
when a reasonable inference from the facts was that a defective tread caused a fall down
the stairs, despite the fact that the jury might have concluded that a heart problem was
the cause, because plaintiffs do not have to eliminate every possible cause as long as they
show facts from which causation may be reasonably inferred), with McInturff v. Chi.
Title & Trust Co., 243 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (ruling that the evidence was
insufficient to raise a jury question on causation where a worker fell down the stairway
with no handrail because there were no eyewitnesses to the fall).
79. In an earlier era, some courts required the same type of direct evidence tying
the breach to the injury as the California Supreme Court did in Saelzler. See, e.g., Wolf
v. Kaufmann, 237 N.Y.S. 550, 551 (App. Div. 1929) (dismissing the plaintiff’s negligence
claim due to the fact that she could not rule out, by eyewitness testimony or other
evidence, the decedent’s improper use of the stairs and thus failed to establish a
sufficient causal connection between his fall and the unlighted stairway). But as Judge
Calabresi observed in writing for the Second Circuit, “All that has changed . . . .”
Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 390 (2d Cir. 1998). As Judge Calabresi
recounts the history, Chief Judge Cardozo of New York and Chief Justice Traynor of
California led the way, leading William Prosser to write that whether the defendant’s
negligence consists of a statutory violation or a breach of the common law standard, “the
court can scarcely overlook the fact that the injury which has in fact occurred is precisely
the sort of thing that proper care on the part of the defendant would be intended to
prevent, and accordingly allow a certain liberality to the jury in drawing its conclusion.”
Id. at 391 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 41, at 270 (5th ed. 1984)).
80. Green, supra note 7, at 548–62.
81. Id. at 559.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 552.
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IV. THE SAELZLER RESULT: WHY SHOULD WE CARE?
Although it may be tempting to dismiss Saelzler as a case in which a
plaintiff’s attorney presented the evidence poorly, the case has greater
implications. Likewise, it would be a mistake to view the case simply as
an endorsement of policy arguments that disfavor plaintiffs’ suing
landowners following injury by third-party criminal attacks.84 While a
majority of the court expressed policy concerns that favor land
possessors, of greater import is that it did so in a manner that sacrifices
crucial distinctions between duty and causation.85 It is precisely because
Saelzler can be rationalized or overlooked that it is important to grapple
with the way in which the case confounds the distinctions between duty
and cause in fact.
The matter of whether a landowner has an obligation to protect a
tenant from criminal conduct on the premises has been addressed
hundreds of times, and courts have found, in the main, that such a duty
can exist.86 Like causation, duty is not absolute; duty is established only
where landowners could foresee a certain type of crime on their property
and only when the level of foreseeability outweighs the burden of
imposing a duty in those circumstances.87 Courts are well aware of the
troubling policy issues that this duty may present.88 A plaintiff who has
84. Koppel raises the issue of whether the liberal summary judgment statute “will
provide leverage for judges to divert cases from the jury that they disfavor on substantive
grounds.” Koppel, supra note 2, at 539–40. I believe it not only provides leverage for
judges, but it also has given judges license to remake tort law.
85. This blurring is ironic, as it does not seem to have been the court’s intent. The
court criticized the court of appeal for blurring causation and duty. Saelzler v. Advanced
Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 2001).
86. See, e.g., HARRY D. MILLER, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 22.54 (3d ed. 2001)
(discussing the basis for recognizing a duty and citing various case examples); MICHAEL
PAUL THOMAS ET AL., CALIFORNIA PREMISES LIABILITY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:50 (1996)
(providing numerous examples of instances where a duty has been recognized by prior case
law); John C. Findlay, Jr., Premises Liability—Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, Inc.:
Is the Landlord His Neighbor’s Keeper?, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 425, 425 (1997) (stating
that “[a] landlord’s duty to protect his tenants from third party criminal actions on his
own property is well defined in the great majority of jurisdictions”).
87. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993)
(“[D]uty in such circumstances is determined by a balancing of ‘foreseeability’ of the
criminal acts against the ‘burdensome, vagueness, and efficacy of the proposed security
measures.” (quoting Gomez v. Ticor, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 606 (Ct. App. 1983))); see also
supra note 6. Duty is a question of law, to be decided on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.,
Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658 (Cal. 1985) (listing multiple
factors a court must consider in deciding whether to impose a duty of care on a landowner).
88. See, e.g., Powell v. Lemon Tree Inv. Co., No. B153363, 2002 WL 31053939,
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pleaded sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment on duty grounds has withstood a powerful test.
However, when the Saelzler majority relied in its causation discussion
on arguments that liability would burden land possessors, it gave
defendants a chance to argue the duty question all over again. The
policy issues the court raised had nothing to do with causation.89 Rather,
they were precisely the same burden arguments that already had been
taken into account in analyzing duty.90 The element of duty, considerably
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2002) (using the policy-oriented factors from Rowland v.
Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), to decide whether there was a duty to an injured
motorist); Caristi v. Dinielli, No. E029053, 2001 WL 1250164, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
18, 2001) (discussing the burden of imposing a duty on a landlord to screen tenants to
determine potential violence and whether such scrupulous screening would even be
effective in preventing injury); Kotecki v. Walsh Constr. Co., 776 N.E.2d 774, 780 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2002) (holding that the effect of imposing a duty on a landowner for injury to
an employee of a painting subcontractor ignores the complicated working realities of a
construction site); Smith v. Dodge Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 811 A.2d 881, 888 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2002) (arguing against imposing a duty on a landlord to protect tenants’ invitees
from criminal activity for fear that this would convert a landlord into an insurer).
89. Some scholars believe that causation should not be tainted by policy
considerations. See, e.g., Green, supra note 7, at 549–50. “The moment some moral
consideration is introduced into the inquiry the issue is no longer one of causal relation.
Causal relation is a neutral issue, blind to right and wrong.” Id. at 549. However, the
seminal causation opinions reveal that policy does indeed play a role. See, e.g., Malone,
supra note 7, at 61. In his classic article, Professor Malone sought to establish that
difficult decisions regarding cause in fact are often influenced by policy. Id. However,
even if one accepts the argument that cause in fact decisions are laden with policy, there
is still a question of what policies are applicable. Malone’s suggestions are highly
subject-specific; for example, fact finders nearly always ignore the uncertainty of rescue
at sea in cases brought by lost seaman, because it would be futile to recognize a duty to
provide rescue equipment and then allow defendants to escape by seizing on the
uncertainty that nearly always attends a rescue operation as a reason for dismissing the
claim. Id. at 75, 77. In Malone’s view, the policy issues relating to cause in fact are so
closely aligned with undefinable values that they are difficult to segregate and
harmonize. Id. at 99. Although he recognizes the power of judges to determine what is
sent to the jury, Malone views cause in fact as a matter where “the layman’s sense of
values is deemed to be as good as that of the judge.” Id.
90. To the extent that one can identify general causation policies, they are quite
distinct. One generalization Malone makes is that:
[w]henever it can be said with fair certainty that the rule of conduct relied upon
by the plaintiff was designed to protect against the very type of risk to which
the plaintiff was exposed, courts have shown very little patience with the
efforts of defendant to question the sufficiency of the proof on cause.
Malone, supra note 7, at 73. Robertson states that all jurisdictions occasionally relax the
normal requirements to serve the ends of justice and catalogs eight conceptual devices
used to do so. These include the following: shifting from the but-for causation test to the
substantial factor test, considering joint tortfeasors to be vicariously responsible for one
another’s conduct, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on cause in fact, using
res ipsa loquitur to avoid causation difficulties, recognizing that a plaintiff may recover
from a defendant who destroyed a chance of avoiding physical injury, holding each of
two tortfeasors liable because they defeated or destroyed the plaintiff’s chances of
proving causation against the other, using joint and several liability law to extend each
tortfeasor’s responsibility, and adopting theories of market share liability. Robertson,
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evolved from seminal cases such as Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.,91 casts judges in the role of gatekeepers. Indeed, many courts
explicitly balance conflicting policy interests to decide who should be
permitted to sue and what types of injuries should be deemed
cognizable.92 The policy concerns presented by the Saelzler court
majority are hardly trivial; essentially, the primary concern is that
landowners will become insurers of entrants on land and that ultimately,
the extraordinary burden of providing extra security will fall on the very
class of persons the plaintiffs represent.93 However, to insert these
supra note 48, at 1775–76. Case law provides examples of each of these devices. Each
is a response to specific factual obstacles that make causation difficult, if not impossible,
to establish utilizing the traditional but-for test and reflects a policy judgment that to
preclude the plaintiff from any chance of recovery would be gravely unfair and indeed
contrary to good policy. For example, Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948),
involved two hunters, each of whom had negligently fired in the direction of the plaintiff.
One piece of gunshot inflicted most of the plaintiff’s damage, but he was unable to
discern the source of the shot. The court shifted the burden of proof to the defendants to
show they were not the cause and, barring their ability to do so, held they would be jointly
and severally liable. Id. at 3–4. Without this burden shift, both defendants would have
escaped liability. In Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970), the California
court, in a somewhat implausible construction of a California statute, held that the burden
of proving causation in a case involving a motel pool drowning shifted to the defendant
motel because the motel’s failure to provide a lifeguard deprived the plaintiff of any
witness to the drowning. Id. at 474–75. The difficulty with the analysis lay in the fact that
the California statute the court was discussing did not require the motel to have a lifeguard.
91. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Justice Cardozo’s conception of duty was narrow in
this case, reflecting none of the broad policy concerns that typify some of his other
opinions. Working within the parameters of the duty element, he assigned the task of
limiting liability to judges. See JOSEPH E. PAGE, TORTS: PROXIMATE CAUSE 46–49, 80 (2003).
92. See, e.g., Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564 (holding that there is a duty of care to
persons foreseeably injured on land, regardless of status, unless public policy mandates an
exception). Departure from this duty involves balancing the following: foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff was injured, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant that a duty would impose, the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved. Id. Leon Green was an early proponent of this policy balancing. See generally
Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928);
Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929).
93. The majority accepted the reasoning of the court of appeal’s dissent, which had
noted that the ultimate cost of liability would be passed on to tenants in the form of
increased rent. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Cal. 2001). Similar
arguments have been made elsewhere in the law (e.g., against recognition of the warranty
of habitability in the 1970s). See, e.g., Joel R. Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2
CONN. L. REV. 61, 89–93 (1969) (discussing the argument that the cost increases
connected with the warranty of habitability will force landlords to raise rents or abandon
their buildings); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law:
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policy concerns into causation analysis, where there is no analytical
mechanism to counterbalance them, gives them too much power.
The policy issues relating to the question of relative culpability as
between the perpetrator of a crime and a landowner are analytically
separate from causation issues. Such concerns might raise proximate
cause issues, but even there the law favors the plaintiff. Courts have
taken the view that they ought to be cautious about releasing a negligent
tortfeasor from liability, especially if that defendant had created the
opportunity for the more culpable perpetrator to act.94 Other tort
doctrines, such as joint and several liability, similarly reflect a policy of
drawing in every culpable party, rather than releasing one at the expense
of the other.95 Indeed, the perceived unfairness of joint and several
liability lies precisely in the fact that the least culpable defendant may
end up paying the whole; nonetheless, this is still the rule in a large

Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 558–59 (1984) (discussing
mainstream critical analysis of the revolution in landlord-tenant law, including critics’
fears that those least able to pay increased rents would lose more than they gain from the
warranty of habitability). Despite these criticisms, many states, either through legislation
or judicial opinion, have adopted the view that public policy demands that property meet
certain minimal criteria. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 5 stat. note 1
(1977) (listing thirty-three states and territories that had adopted legislation requiring the
landlord to put leased premises into a condition fit for their intended use as of June 1,
1976); 2 RICHARD R. POWELL ET AL., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 16B.04[2] n.42
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2003) (listing twenty jurisdictions in which state supreme
courts have handed down decisions establishing something akin to the implied warranty
of habitability).
94. See, e.g., Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947, 952 (Cal. 1983)
(finding that it was “of no consequence” that the harm to the plaintiff resulted through
the negligent or reckless harm of a third person); Richardson v. Ham, 285 P.2d 269, 272
(Cal. 1955) (finding that the intentional act of a third party in joyriding did not supersede
the negligence of the defendant, who left a bulldozer unlocked, creating a risk of harm to
the plaintiffs)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, § 449; see also PAGE, supra note
91, at 185–89 (stating that defendants should not be permitted to argue a lack of
proximate cause solely on the ground that a wrongful intervention superseded the
defendant’s negligence, but suggesting that extent-of-liability issues might arise if the
type of harm perpetrated was completely different from the misconduct against which
the defendant was obligated to protect the plaintiff); David W. Robertson, Negligence
Liability for Crimes and Intentional Torts Committed by Others, 67 TUL. L. REV. 135,
138–41 (1992) (discussing the Restatement and Louisiana law).
95. The premise of joint and several liability has not changed over time. In its
most common application, each of two or more tortfeasors who is a but-for cause of an
indivisible injury is liable for the full extent of the plaintiff’s injury. See Robertson,
supra note 48, at 1789. This ensures that injured plaintiffs can recover fully, even in the
event of insolvency or unavailability of one codefendant. See, e.g., Miller v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 290 U.S. 227, 236 (1933) (citing a number of early U.S. Supreme Court and
federal circuit court cases as establishing that “[t]he rule is settled by innumerable
authorities that if injury be caused by the concurring negligence of the defendant and a
third person, the defendant is liable to the same extent as though it had been caused by
his negligence alone”).
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number of jurisdictions.96 Thus, if policy issues such as the burden on
the defendant or relative culpability as between two potential tortfeasors
come to dominate cause in fact, they have the potential to undercut not
only cause in fact, but also other tort doctrines, such as proximate cause or
joint and several liability, which have distinct, and often conflicting, goals.
This crossing of doctrinal lines is significant, not merely a technical
quibble, because it challenges, albeit surreptitiously, the very premise of
landowner responsibility. Saelzler, of course, does not completely
insulate defendants. A defendant cannot totally ignore the threat of
liability because it is impossible to predict in advance whether a victim
will be able to present evidence that could connect a security breach with
an injury. However, the likelihood that a plaintiff will be able to show
that an assailant exploited a security breach to perpetrate a crime seems
small enough that landowners can plausibly anticipate reduced liability
on negligent security claims.97 As a result, landowners may decide that
96. Most states retain either pure joint and several liability or some other form.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 cmt. a (2000); see also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.
v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210, 1224–28 (2003) (upholding joint and several liability under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, even where some plaintiffs’ asbestos exposure was
significantly greater from sources other than the defendants’ negligence). Even states
that have reformed joint and several liability frequently retain some aspects of it. For
example, in California, joint and several liability was limited by the passage of Proposition
51, which limits an individual tortfeasor’s liability for noneconomic damages to an amount
equal to that tortfeasor’s proportionate fault. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 2003).
However, liability for economic losses remains joint and several. Id.
97. One might legitimately question whether tort law truly has a deterrent impact
in the real world. Professor Gary Schwartz reviewed the evidence regarding landowner
liability for a variety of torts, including failure to protect invitees and customers from
criminal attack, and found that, as a consequence of the development of tort liability,
landowners had taken a wide variety of steps to reduce the likelihood of injury. Gary T.
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?,
42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 416–20 (1994). Ultimately, Schwartz concludes that tort law is
“moderately successful” in deterring negligent conduct. Id. at 444. Other scholars have
been more skeptical. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV.
785, 808–13 (1990) (arguing that there are serious flaws in the fault-based, risk-benefit
analysis that cause the tort system to fail at deterring unsafe behavior; these flaws are,
among others, the theoretical impossibility of calculating the benefits of accident
avoidance, the unequal exposure to risk of those least likely to claim or recover damages,
the inability of the trier of fact to correctly perform a cost-benefit analysis, and the fact
that the efficacy of tort liability in encouraging safety rests on the dubious assumption
that all defendants will attempt to maximize profits); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away
with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 558–59 (1985) (stating that the following
undermine the deterrent potential of tort liability: society’s failure to instruct people
effectively in their civil obligations, the perceived unpredictability of the system, the
failure of even ordinary people to act reasonably at all times, the difficulty that
organizations confront in actually making cost-effective changes in their behavior, the
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precautionary measures are not cost-justified. Further, it is apparent that
the Saelzler opinion leaves the most vulnerable and poorest plaintiffs in
the worst position.98 Those who are hurt badly will fare much worse
than those able to track down an intruder. People who do not live in
apartment complexes with security cameras or other recording
technology will be worse off than those who do. Landowners will have
a disincentive to install such devices because these installations might
assist a plaintiff in proving that a broken gate was used to enter or that a
stranger committed the assault. In short, plaintiffs like Saelzler, who had
no ability to protect herself while making a delivery, take such jobs at
their own risk and are left completely unprotected.99
Tenants who live in complexes like that owned by Advanced Group 400
may not have higher rents due to the landowners’ increased liability premiums,
but nor will they have leverage either to insist that security function properly
or to insist that money be allocated to improve it.100 In response, businesses
such as United Parcel Service and Federal Express may join many pizza
companies in refusing to allow their employees to enter such premises, thus
cutting tenants off from services that others in society take for granted.101

tendency to discount the threat of liability, the need of some to take great risk despite the
threat of the liability, and the generally low average cost of tort liability to most
defendants); see also Dolan, supra note 15 (recounting an interview with Frederic D.
Cohen, representative of a consortium of landowners, who stated that the Saelzler ruling
will not deter his clients from securing their properties, and explaining that the ruling
was needed to prevent juries from blaming property owners for crimes, notwithstanding
the existence of good security).
98. Apart from the argument that this burden will weigh most heavily on those of
lower socioeconomic status, one might also consider whether it impacts women more
than men. Statistics indicate that female victims predominate in two categories of
violent crime: violence between intimates and rape. See Elizabeth A. Pendo,
Recognizing Violence Against Women: Gender and the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 17
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 157, 165 n.44 (1994) (citing CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 1 (1991)). In other types of crime, men have
been victimized at a higher rate, though the disparity between men and women is closing. See
U.S. Department of Justice, Victim Characteristics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict_v.htm
findings (last revised Mar. 9, 2003); see also Dolan, supra note 15 (quoting Daniel B.
Wolfberg, Saelzler’s attorney, who stated, “I don’t think there is a case out there that has
a man being a victim”).
99. Saelzler may have been fortunate enough to have workers’ compensation. But
workers’ compensation may not fully compensate for her losses. The benefits and the
costs of workers’ compensation declined, after a period of growth, for most of the 1990s.
See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 807 (7th ed.
2001). Some types of harm are excluded from coverage, including pain and suffering,
disfigurement, psychic harm, loss of taste, smell, or sensation, and injury to sexual
organs or function. Id. at 814.
100. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1164 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar
J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., id. at 1147.
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V. HOW WILL SAELZLER AFFECT THE LITIGATION PROCESS?
I have already argued that Saelzler, if applied rigidly and mechanistically,
has the potential to undermine judicial recognition of landowner duty
and to muddy the law of causation. I think the case will affect the
litigation process as well. The primary impact will be to make the
litigation of this type of claim so burdensome that attorneys will view
most cases presented as exercises in futility.
One reason that attorneys will disfavor claims like Saelzler’s is
because the evidence needed to meet the burden of establishing
causation will commonly be unavailable. Generally, courts believe that
the goal of requiring that all available evidence be presented is a salutary
one.102 I have no quarrel with that aim. However, there are practical
obstacles that significantly hinder plaintiffs in gathering that evidence.
Injured parties, especially gravely injured ones, frequently are not in a
position to even hire attorneys until months after an accident has
occurred. If they wait, evidence such as fingerprints, or the operational
state of a security device at the precise time of the accident, is likely to
be unavailable.103 In the rare case in which eyewitnesses exist, they may
be difficult to find if they do not come forward and identify themselves.
The difficulty of obtaining evidence does not excuse a failure to pursue
102. See, e.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 360 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Posner, C.J.) (noting that “[a] court shouldn’t be required to expend its scarce resources
of time and effort on a case until the plaintiff has conducted a sufficient investigation to
make reasonably clear that an expenditure of public resources is likely to yield a
significant social benefit”). The Seventh Circuit rejected Wal-Mart’s contention that
there was not enough evidence of liability to allow the case to go the jury. Id. at 359.
Although the evidence was thin as to the source of the liquid soap that the plaintiff had
slipped on in the store, the court stated there was no reason to believe that the plaintiff
was withholding information or that she had failed to thoroughly investigate the case. Id.
at 360. Judge Posner also stated that, given the low financial stakes, it was not
reasonable to expect the parties to develop the evidence further. Id.
103. For example, in Saelzler, the plaintiff presented evidence that the security gate
was propped open on the day she entered. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1147. She also presented
evidence of forty-five other instances involving broken security gates in the year before
the accident. Id. However, she apparently did not produce evidence of why the gate was
propped open on the day in question, or whether the assailants had entered through that
gate and broken it in the process. Id. The court was very critical of these evidentiary
deficits. Id. Likewise, in Yoon, the plaintiff’s expert inspected the liquor store one year
after the armed robbery occurred. Yoon v. Suh, No. B144809, 2001 WL 1227950, at *3
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2001). Despite the expert’s familiarity with the neighborhood
through his police work and his testimony that it appeared that no one had made any
effort to deter any kind of crime on the property, he was unable to testify that things were
in exactly the same condition as they had been in on the night of the robbery. Id.
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it, nor is it unique to this type of premises liability case.104 However, if
plaintiffs in this type of case are required to establish that the defendants
in fact utilized security breaches to perpetrate the attacks, as opposed to
the usual burden on causation, factual deficits become insuperable.
Even assuming that there is evidence available to present to a court,
the financial burden of having to develop a case in its entirety early on,
in anticipation of a motion for summary judgment, is significant. No
one could disagree that attorneys should gather the facts before filing a
complaint, but to meet the threshold set by Saelzler requires a level of
proof that is far more extensive. Moreover, the prospect of waiting to
see whether a motion is filed is risky because, in many jurisdictions, the
time within which to respond to a motion for summary judgment is
short.105 While the California Code of Civil Procedure was recently
amended to extend the notice period to seventy-five days,106 a move
viewed as favorable to the plaintiffs’ bar,107 Saelzler will compel
attorneys to expend money and time developing all available evidence as
soon as they file a complaint. Further, plaintiffs’ attorneys will need to
allege and attempt to prove every possible breach of duty, rather than a
select few, because the chances of proving causation improve
dramatically with slight differences in issue formulation.108 As an
example, Saelzler may have come out differently had the plaintiff
alleged either that the defendants unreasonably failed to provide escorts
104. See, for example, Warren v. Jeffries, 139 S.E.2d 718, 720 (S.C. 1965), a sad
case in which a nonsuit in action for wrongful death based on res ipsa loquitur was
affirmed because of a lack of evidence as to the condition of the car that killed the
decedent. The car had never been inspected after the accident.
105. See, e.g., BANKR. D. ARIZ. R. 9013-1(g) (stating that the time to respond to a
motion for summary judgment is thirty days); D.N.H. R. 7.1(b) (stating that objections to
summary judgment motions shall be filed within thirty days from the date the motion is
served); TEX. CT. R.C.P. 166a(c) (providing that “[e]xcept on leave of court, the adverse
party, not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing
affidavits or other written response”).
106. Section 437(c)(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure was amended to
extend the notice period, effective January 1, 2003. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(a) (West
Supp. 2003). As a practical matter, noticed motions must now be made seventy-five days
before a hearing and no later than thirty days before the trial date. Id. The amendments
also include a provision allowing supplemental discovery in some cases upon continuance
by the trial court, and supplemental briefing in some cases. Id. § 437c(h), (i), (m)(2).
107. William M. Hensley, Recent Developments on the Summary Judgment Motion
Front, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Dec. 2002, at 6.
108. Leon Green argued that a connection to a defendant’s course of conduct should
suffice. Green, supra note 7, at 555. However, most courts and scholars do not accept
this view and require that the plaintiff connect the specific breach to the injury. See
Robertson, supra note 48, at 1768–75. One effect of the narrowness of the requirement
is that the result may turn on how the breach is described, and thus, the conception of
causation becomes very easily manipulated. This result-oriented argumentation exists in
other areas of tort law as well, such as the risk-foreseeability test in the area of proximate
cause. See PAGE, supra note 91, at 104–05. But it is not a positive trait.
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for delivery persons or that the defendants were negligent, given the
prevalent violence at the complex, for failing to warn them not to enter
the premises unescorted.109 Pursuing proof on all of these various
scenarios will further increase costs.110
Another way in which the litigation process may change is that
defendants will look to causation as the first possible ground for gaining
dismissal. Litigating duty issues requires that the plaintiff and defendant
gather evidence pertaining to the crime rate and patterns on the
property.111 Because most attorneys presumably would not accept cases
in which they could not make some showing of the foreseeability of
similar criminal activity on the premises, a defendant must convince the
court of the unfairness of allowing the suit to proceed. The defendant
must argue that either the burden of imposing a duty is too great or the
value of imposing a duty is too low.112 Litigating causation issues is
simple by comparison; if the plaintiff does not have evidence indicating
that a security device or measure was directly implicated in an attack,
the defendant will be able to gain dismissal on a summary judgment
motion. Unlike a motion to dismiss, however, the plaintiff’s complaint
will not be judged on the pleadings. Following Saelzler as a model, a
court can and will make any number of factual inferences about whether
an alleged breach is causative. A court can simply conclude that extra
security would not help because guards would not have been there to see
the crime, or that functioning parking garage doors do not matter
because intruders can always follow legitimate entrants into the
109. The court viewed the plaintiff’s warning claim as a much more general, vague,
and unproven contention that the plaintiff, as a member of the public, should have been
warned against unidentified assailants. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143,
1147 (Cal. 2001). This highly unfavorable characterization and the purported lack of
proof precluded the theory from driving the litigation.
110. There will be some reduction in costs if courts adhere to the view that experts
are not very helpful in these types of cases. There is no real harm in precluding expert
opinion, so long as this prohibition is applied to both sides. See supra text
accompanying notes 60–63. Generally, lay opinion as to whether a breach is a but-for
cause or a substantial factor in bringing about an injury is as competent as expert
opinion, and thus peculiarly a case for the jury. See Robertson, supra note 48, at 1768–69.
111. See, e.g., Cooper v. House of Blues Entm’t, No. B151007, 2002 WL
31248870, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2002) (indicating that there were several prior
criminal assaults and other incidents on the premises); Sandoval v. Bank of Am., 115
Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating that prior criminal assaults on the bank
mandated increased security).
112. Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215–16 (Cal. 1993) (holding
that, under the duty analysis, prior similar incidents are required to be proven almost
always for foreseeability to be great enough to outbalance the burden of hiring security).
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garage.113 Sometimes these factual inferences may seem ludicrous and
improbable,114 but there will be little a plaintiff can do about them. The
end result is that plaintiffs’ attorneys will be extremely reluctant to
litigate this type of case unless they can clear the exceptionally high
hurdle of proving causation with certainty.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS
As noted at the outset of this Essay, there are no easy answers to the
problem I describe; however, there are several possible ways to
ameliorate Saelzler’s harsh impact on plaintiffs. The first of these is
simply that courts must be aware of the implications of decisions like
Saelzler and must recommit themselves to time-tested principles of
proof and causation and to the jury’s role in deciding issues of fact. It is
inevitable that challenges to the plaintiff’s evidence will arise before
trial. Summary judgment procedure, modeled in many instances after
federal law, gives the defendant the right to put the plaintiff’s evidence
to the test early on.115 But procedural revisions to summary judgment
law cannot be permitted to undermine substantive tort law, whether by
converting cause in fact into a duty surrogate or by obliterating the
distinction between questions of fact and questions of law.
Tort law clearly demands that the plaintiff show that the defendant’s
breach actually brought about some harm to the plaintiff. But these
requirements are moderated by the preponderance standard, which
clarifies the important principle that causation need not be proven as an
absolute, or indeed with any more certainty than the “more likely than
not” threshold requires.116 What rises to the level of plausibly satisfying
that standard ultimately has to be a matter within the courts’ discretion.117
Thus, in evaluating the evidence brought before them, judges must be
113. See Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 792 (1996).
114. Courts following Saelzler’s reasoning would seemingly reject the notion that
security devices, such as locking gates and security companies, have deterrent functions.
They would assume these measures have no relation to the prevention of crime unless there
is proof positive that the devices were exploited. See Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1151–52, 1154.
115. Koppel, supra note 2, at 490, 497–506.
116. Professor Robertson states that “[t]he juxtaposition of wrongful conduct likely
to cause a particular type of harm and a victim who has suffered that type of harm is
sufficient to satisfy the cause-in-fact requirement in the absence of unusual circumstances
that clearly defeat the normal inference.” Robertson, supra note 48, at 1775.
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 28. The comment to section 28(a)
notes that philosophers have taught that factual cause is “not a phenomenon that can be
seen or perceived,” but “instead, it is an inference drawn based on prior experience and
some, often limited, understanding of the other causal factors—the causal mechanism—
required for the outcome.” Id. at cmt. b. The comment also acknowledges that “[t]he
difficulty is often that evidence does not provide any reasoned method for determining
what the respective probabilities are for the potential causes.” Id.
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mindful that the conclusive evidence they seek is not legally required, nor
is it possible, in many instances, to obtain. If they remember these basic
tenets of causation, causation issues can be handled without the need to
take the extraordinary doctrinal step of shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant.118 Finally, as much as courts might like to avoid giving jurors
the discretion to find that a breach was causally related, factual inferences
have long been the jury’s province, and there they should stay.119
Courts also need to maintain the distinction between duty and cause in
fact.120 The duty requirements are so tough and so replete with policy
considerations that it is hard to believe there would be any policy stone
left unturned if duty were truly contested. The effect of moving

118. Saelzler and cases like it would not easily fit within the recognized theories
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. See supra note 90. It is more accurate to
view the causal problem in Saelzler as but one example of a problem numerous cases
share: whether safe behavior would have avoided the injury. DOBBS, supra note 10, at
407. Professor Dobbs gives numerous examples of the liberal impulses of courts in such
cases. He states, however, that it is “hard to escape the feeling that the but-for rule with
its hypothetical alternative case can be applied rigorously in some cases and quite lightly
in others.” Id. at 421–22.
119. Commentary to section 28(a) also notes that, because “modest [factual]
differences . . . can substantially affect the power of an inference. . . . [T]he general approach
of a given jurisdiction toward the degree of freedom afforded juries . . . is critical.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 28 cmt. b. The comment further notes that many
courts are lenient if the plaintiff has done all that is reasonably possible to gather and
present evidence. Id. Other courts have been willing to adopt a presumption of
causation depending on the type of tortious conduct and the difficulties of proof faced by
the plaintiff. Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 48, at 1774 (explaining that “when a
defendant has engaged in [negligent conduct that] often leads to the kind of harm the
plaintiff has suffered, [courts are] rightfully impatient with the defendant’s claim that the
plaintiff cannot prove [causation]”).
120. Nola M. provides an example of a court that “protesteth too much.” Nola M. v.
Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 108–09 (Ct. App. 1993) (“Are we using causation as a
smokescreen for a policy judgment on whether USC ought to be liable to Nola under the
circumstances of this case? We don’t think so.”). The Nola M. court discussed various
policy issues, all relating to duty questions, including the issue of judicial line drawing,
the question of who would pay for security, the issue of whether police protection is a
governmental or private function, and the question of what impact tort litigation would
have on landowner insurance. Id.; see also Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564
(Cal. 1968) (indicating that the balancing test for departure from landowner general duty
of care involves balancing the following: the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff was injured, the closeness of the connection between
the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of a burden to the
defendant a duty would impose, the consequences to the community of imposing a duty, and
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved).
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concerns over the costs of increased security into the causation issue is
that they gain disproportionate power because causation law has no
context in which to weigh the burden against relevant countervailing
considerations.121 Many of the troubling implications of Saelzler and
cases like it have never been aired simply because the issues are so
difficult to assess in the causation context. In short, courts need to be
much more cognizant of how tort law and policy work in the context of
negligence. They need to be more honest about the bases of their
decisions. If policy concerns about opening land possessors to liability
are really at the core, they ought to grapple with them as duty issues. If
an absence of evidence to prove a breach is the problem, as it may have
been in some cases, they should step up to the plate and say so. They
should not use rigid assessments of evidentiary sufficiency in proof of
causation to obscure the true grounds for their decisions.
As to the specific problem of landowner disincentives to provide
security for tenants and other entrants on land, in the absence of an
interpretive shift by the courts, there may be a need for a regulatory or
legislative structure that imposes certain affirmative obligations on
landowners.122 Landowners of high crime buildings or complexes
should not be permitted to completely abdicate responsibility for
121. Professor Malone asserted that the courts are prone to hold certain plaintiffs to a
rigorous standard of proof when courts view the claim being litigated as one of less
importance, or if they question the connection between the harm and the interests the legal
claim seeks to protect. Malone, supra note 7, at 72–73. The Reporter’s Note to section 28
of the Third Restatement says that Malone’s insight may help explain cases like Saelzler.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 28 Reporter’s Note cmt. b. While I think it is
inevitable that policy considerations will affect courts’ views of causation, the policy issues
pertinent to causation are distinct from those relating to duty, and the transposition of those
policies muddies the causation question. See supra note 90 (discussing causation policy).
122. Professor B.A. Glesner discusses several statutory duties in her exhaustive
article. These take the form of municipal statutes imposing a duty to provide security or
to provide clean and safe housing conditions. B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort,
Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the
Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 701–02 (1992). Glesner states that these
statutory requirements provide explicit predictable security standards, but they fail to
protect the landlord because they generally do not provide that compliance with the
statute would protect the landlord from liability. Id. Glesner also states that the public
nuisance doctrine may create broad liability; while criminal nuisance is a possibility,
most public officials utilize civil public nuisance because it is less costly to prove and
litigate. Id. at 723–24. Forfeiture of a landlord’s property interests under federal law is
also a possibility in the event the property is used to facilitate a drug violation with the
landlord’s knowledge or consent. Id. at 742–56. Professor Glesner concludes that
increased legal responsibility for landlords is bad from a policy perspective, doing
nothing to address the root causes of crime and serving mostly to relocate crime to other
areas. Id. at 772–73. She also concludes that heightened requirements for screening
place the landlords in the position of trying to navigate around other laws that limit how
much information they can obtain. Id. at 780–82. Finally, Glesner concludes that the
most effective mechanisms include vigorous enforcement of building codes, growth of
crime watch activities, and increases in youth activities. Id. at 788–89.
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providing a reasonably safe environment.123 One possibility would be to
impose a system of graduated fines on land possessors who offer
security devices but fail to keep them operative. While the risk of a fine
is in no way equivalent to the risk of tort liability, a fine might at least provide
some incentive for landowners not to leave land entrants at risk. Another
possibility would be to require landlords to warn those entering the property
that their security cannot be guaranteed.124 In the case of delivery persons,
landlords could be required to structure a delivery method that takes into
account risks to the potential victim. Building or housing codes impose
other requirements on landowners,125 and there is no reason they could not
impose some measure of responsibility on land possessors.126
Finally, it would be a mistake to dismiss as an isolated phenomenon
Saelzler’s subtle undermining of causation and the jury’s role.
Causation has always been difficult to prove with certainty, and there are
many other areas of tort law where plaintiffs rely on the preponderance
123. Even critics of the duty to protect acknowledge that, in some instances, there
must be minimum standards. Professor William K. Jones takes the view that victims of
crime can only obtain those protections for which they are prepared to pay. William K.
Jones, Tort Triad: Slumbering Sentinels, Vicious Assailants, and Victims Variously
Vigilant, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253, 282–83 (2001). He would impose limited duties in
tort stemming from violations of building codes, breaches of express or implied promises
about the safety of the premises, and several other limited scenarios. Id. But recognition
of these limited duties would not solve the causation problem that plaintiffs encounter.
Thus, a regulatory approach may prove necessary.
124. Although the trial court dismissed Saelzler’s failure to warn claim on the
ground that she had no proof that it would have been feasible or effective, see Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1148 (Cal. 2001), in reality, warnings are entirely
feasible. A sign posted on a gate warning delivery persons that they should not enter
without an escort, or that their safety cannot be guaranteed, would easily alert entrants to
the risk and permit them to make informed decisions as to whether or not to enter. Of
course, no landowners want to post such signs on their premises, but if landowners are
largely protected from negligent security claims by Saelzler, the lack of warning
obligations only compounds the risks to land entrants.
125. Some states have statutes that require disclosure of specific items to
prospective purchasers and lessees. Professor Saxer identifies disclosure of sex
offenders living in the area as a prime example. Saxer, supra note 4, at 552. Section
2079.10a of the California Civil Code requires that written leases and rental agreements
disclose the existence of a database of registered sex offenders, relieves the lessor of
further disclosure obligations, and precludes the sex offender from bringing suit against
the disclosing lessor. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.10a (West Supp. 2003).
126. The benefit of a statutory approach is that it would give a land possessor
specific guidance about what must be done, both with regard to maintaining property and
with respect to disclosure to land entrants. A land possessor might worry that disclosure
of criminal activity could result in invasion of privacy or other tort actions. Statutes
might shield the land possessor from liability in the event disclosures are made as
required. See Saxer, supra note 4, at 562–64.
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standard to surmount causal uncertainty.127 If summary judgment procedure
is understood as giving courts license to change the substantive law sub
rosa, there will be no confining it to cases involving causation or
premises liability.128

127. One such area is res ipsa loquitur. Though res ipsa is a doctrine used to
establish breach, it has a causative aspect: the jury is asked to decide whether the
defendant is the most probable responsible cause. Normally, judges rely on the common
knowledge and general experiences of jurors to make this assessment. See DAN B.
DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 176 (4th ed. 2001).
128. In fact, Professor Koppel’s study of summary judgment procedure under both
the federal and California standards led him to conclude that “the premonitions of the
dissenting justices in both trilogies regarding the overuse of summary judgment were not
without substance.” Koppel, supra note 2, at 573.

1000

